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Claims must be related
The City also argued that
the district court erred in awarding
O'Neal $4,715 in attorney's fees
pursuant to her unsuccessful class
certification motion. The City
contended that this amount should
be excluded from the award because
the motion was denied and unrelated
to the remaining claims. A two-part
inquiry was used to determine if the
fees for the unsuccessful motion
were appropriate: 1) whether the
plaintiff's unsuccessful claim was
related to the prevailing claims; and
2) if the claims were related,

whether the plaintiff's claims were
successful. If the plaintiff prevailed
and obtained excellent results, full
compensation may be appropriate,
but if only limited success was
obtained, full compensation may be
excessive. The court concluded that
the class certification was related to
the other claims. The motion was
not a separate claim, but rather a
means of pursuing her successful
claims. Because O'Neal prevailed
on the merits of these claims, the
court held that the district court was
correct in awarding attorney's fees
for the class certification motion. On
remand, the district court was

instructed to reevaluate the
attorney's fees after the reversal of
the injunction.
In summary, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the City had
violated O'Neal's equal protection
rights by refusing to provide water
service to her based on a prior
tenant's unpaid water bill. O'Neal
was awarded attorney's fees and
costs as deemed appropriate on
remand. However, the court found
no justiciable controversy to warrant
the issuance of an injunction against
the City. Therefore, the court
affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded.

Interest construed to include late payment charges
by John Bartels
In Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d 441,900 P.2d 690 (1995), the Supreme
Court of California determined the National Bank Act
must preempt California regulation of bank interest
rates, and the term "interest," as used in section 30 of the
National Bank Act of 1864, must be construed to cover
late payment fees charged by credit card issuers, if such
fees are allowed by a national bank's home state.

Class action suit in state court: late payment
charges claimed to be penalties
Plaintiff Barbara Smiley filed a class action suit
in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against
defendant Citibank. Smiley was acting on behalf of
herself and fellow California Citibank credit card
holders who had been contracted for, or charged with,
late payment fees by Citibank. Smiley contended that
the regulation of interest rates by California was not
preempted by the National Bank Act. Further, she
argued that late payment fees charged by Citibank were
properly considered penalties, and thus fairly regulated
by California consumer law prohibiting the imposition
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of such penalties. Citibank argued that the National
Bank Act, which permits national banks to "export" the
interest rates of their home states (late payment charges
are permitted by South Dakota, Citibank's home state
for credit card operations), should be determined to
preempt California regulations. Citibank also argued that
late payment fees must be included within the definition
of interest. Citibank unsuccessfully attempted to remove
the case to federal district court. The Superior Court of
California denied Citibank's demur for a judgment on
the pleadings; the Court of Appeals, finding that the
National Bank Act preempted California regulation,
reversed. Smiley appealed.

Section 85 preempts California law
Section 30 of the National Bank Act of 1864,
codified in section 85 of title 12 of the United States
Code ("section 85") provides that a national banking
association, or a national bank, "may take, receive,
reserve, and charge on any loan.., interest at the rate
allowed by the laws of the State... where the bank is
located." The court concluded that the federal act did
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indeed preempt state law. The court relied on Marquette
Nat. Bank v. Firstof Omaha Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978),
where the Supreme Court interpreted section 85 as
preempting state legislation of interest rates, and also as
permitting a national bank to demand and collect interest
on any loan, at the rate permitted under the bank's home
state's law. This includes rates of interest which might
even be unlimited, and also permits a bank to "export"
its home state's interest rate. The California court next
determined the scope of the word "interest": Did the late
payment charges required by Citibank fall within the
definition of the term "interest?"

Scope of interest can include late payment
fees
The California Supreme Court first examined
the purpose of section 85 of the National Bank Act: to
facilitate a national banking system, and to specifically
grant national banks "most favored lender" status in
their home states in an effort to protect them from
potentially unfriendly state legislation. Examining the
word "interest" in the context of the Act, the court built
upon the common understanding of the word "interest":
a periodic charge based on a percentage of a certain sum
of loaned funds.
The court reasoned that the word could be
defined more broadly than as commonly understood to
include late payment fees, payable in the event of
default. Analogizing credit cards to loans, the interest
paid on those cards was compensation for the use of a
creditor's money. Payments of late fees were compensation for the retention or use of loaned funds beyond the
date of maturity of the loan. The court rejected Smiley's
classification of such fees as "penalties," and also found
that late payment fees have never been held unlawful per
se under the common law.
The court also indicated several policy concerns for holding the definition of "interest" to include
late payment fees. If interest did not impliedly include
late payment fees, the purpose of the National Bank Act,
to grant national banks "most favored lender" status,
would be frustrated by unfriendly state legislation. The
court stated:
"Thus, a state could allow periodic
percentage charges payable absolutely
1995-1996

by maturity for all lenders, including
national banks, but fix them at a rate
so low that they could lend only at a
loss. It might then allow late payment
fees to some lenders, not including
national banks, at a level high enough
that they could lend at a profit. Such a
result would be untenable."
Smiley, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 451."
The court was concerned that if late payment
fees were not included within the definition of interest,
national banks would lose their "most favored lender"
status and be at the mercy of state banks, defeating the
purpose of the National Bank Act. In addition, if the
court were to accept Smiley's argument, that such fees
could be regulated by state interests, such regulation
could limit the availability and variety of credit terms
permitted on interstate loans. Such limitations could
restrict the ability of a national bank to lend on favorable
conditions, and restrict the ability of national bank
customers to borrow on reasonable conditions. Last, the
court determined it was reasonable to make late payers
shoulder the burden they themselves create, and that
imposing late payment fees would create a deterrent
effect against such individuals creating that burden.
The court also found further support for their
holding in the fact that, despite amendments to the Act,
the term interest as used in the Act has not been
changed. The decision was also found to accord with the
decisions of several other courts which had considered
the same issue, was in line with interpretations of the
same issue by the Comptroller of the Currency, and
conformed with the opinions and views of experts on the
issue.

Majority ignores statutory language and
congressional intent
Justice Arabian dissented from the decision,
finding the majority came to a conclusion that ignored
statutory text, and ignored a key feature of the American
banking system, the interest of individual states, rather
than the federal government, in regulating national
banks. Justice Arabian believed it was unjust that
California regulation of banks be determined by small
states which have deregulated consumer credit in
Recent Cases * 65

attempts to attract the business of national credit card
issuing banks.
Justice Arabian regarded the majority's
expansive definition of interest, based on the need to
protect national banks' "most favored lending" status, as
seriously flawed. He asserted that such an expansive
definition failed on the grounds that it simply was not
supported by the language of the statute or Congressional record. The statute, in using the word "interest,"
was never unaccompanied by the word "rate"; he found
it highly unlikely for Congress, in enacting the legislation, to have had any other definition in its mind other
than the narrowly, popularly understood definition cited
to by the majority - a sum linked to the lending of
money, calculated at a rate or percentage of the loan
over time. Further, Congressional debate centered on
"interest rates," and did not consider any notions of the
expansive definition embraced by the majority.
Justice Arabian also disputed the majority's
determination that the purpose of the National Bank Act
was to provide "favored lending" status to national
banks. As the Act was passed during the middle of the
Civil War, Justice Arabian found that the purpose of the
Act was the financing of the conflict. Section 85 was
provided, not to protect national banks from local efforts
to destroy them, but to induce state banks to change their
charters over to federal charters, and protect the future

of banking in the United States.
Further, Justice Arabian pointed out that at the
time of passage of the National Bank Act in 1864, and at
the time of the Marquette decision, interstate banking as
it persists today simply was not in existence. It was
untenable to conclude from the Act and the above case
that non-interest credit terms such as late payment
penalties were impliedly included within the definition
of interest. It was not logical to hold that Congress
should include late payment fees in its definition of
interest when such fees were as of yet non-existent.

Late payment fees are penalties, not interest
Justice George also dissented, and took
exception to the majority reading into the word "interest" any definition other than its common and properly
understood definition, believing such fees to be properly
viewed as either penalties or liquidated damages.
Nothing in the statute or legislative history suggested
that Congress meant to include within the definition of
"interest" such payments, and indeed, several leading
Supreme Court cases at the time of enactment made it
clear that such late payment charges would not be
considered interest for the purpose of ruling on usury
cases.

USDA regulations eclipse Kansas farmer's state
claims
by Russ Collins
Robert Murphy purchased vaccinations for his
cows that ultimately failed. However, in Murphy v.
Smithkline Beecham Animal Health Group, 898
F.Supp. 811 (D. Kan. 1995), the Kansas District Court
prevented Murphy from suing the vaccine's manufacturer. The Kansas court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion on the ground that Congress
granted the United States Department of Agriculture
("USDA") ultimate authority to regulate the safety,
efficacy, potency, and purity of veterinary biological
products.
In late 1993, Murphy began injecting the cows
from his cattle feeding business with BoviShield 4 and
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BoviShield 4 + L5 -

vaccines manufactured by

Smithkline Beecham Animal Health Group
("Smithkline"). Although Murphy administered the
injections until early 1994, the vaccines failed to prevent
the cows from developing, and in some cases caused the
cows to develop, debilitating or fatal infections and
diseases.
Murphy sued Smithkline alleging breach of
implied warranty, false advertising, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligence, and failure to warn of dangers
associated with use of the vaccine. In response,
Smithkline filed a motion for summary judgment and
argued federal USDA regulations, specifically the VirusVolume 8, number 2

